for plaintiffs' lawyers but secure no significant benefits for overcharged victims. 3 Others suggest that private litigation merely follows an easy trail blazed by government enforcers and adds little to government sanctions. 4 Yet others contend that, in light of government enforcement, private cases in the United States lead to excessive deterrence. Further, one
However, Professor Cavanagh provides only an anecdote to support these conclusions. He offers no data to show the type of antitrust settlements he describes are typical or to demonstrate how often they result in useless coupons. 4 John C. Coffee, Jr. at one point subscribed to this view, but later concluded the evidence was to the contrary. John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 669 n. 36 (1986) ("Although the conventional wisdom has long been that class actions tend to 'tag along' on the heels of governmentally initiated suits, a recent study of antitrust litigation by Professors Kauper and Snyder has placed this figure at '[l]ess than 20% of private antitrust actions filed between 1976 and 1983.'"). 5 As the Antitrust Modernization Commission noted: " [S] ome have argued that treble damages, along with other remedies, can overdeter some conduct that may not be anticompetitive and result in duplicative recovery. No actual cases or evidence or systematic overdeterrence were presented to the Commission, however." ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, REPORT AND proportion of the money was recovered from foreign entities, whether the private litigation was preceded by government action, and on whose behalf money was recovered (direct purchasers, indirect purchasers, or a competitor).
To our knowledge no similar study has ever been undertaken. 19 Securities were counted in one case because they had a readily ascertainable market value.
Of this, more than $5,706 to $7,056 million came from foreign companies that violated U.S. antitrust laws. Table 2 shows that 18 of the 40 cases involved this kind of recovery, which means that without the private enforcement of the antitrust laws this money would have remained with foreign lawbreakers 20 To arrive at this number we counted related cases as being a single "case." For example, there have been many separate legal actions involving vitamins cartels. However, this report analyzes and counts them all together as one "case." 21 For simplicity we are calling all of the charges "allegations," even the ones proven in court. 22 We did not change recoveries to 2009 dollars or otherwise correct for the time-value of money. All figures include the awarded attorneys' fees.
Although a United States verdict would produce treble damages for victims, almost all of our cases involved settlements, and in no case did a court determine the percentage overcharge. We know of no way to determine whether any of the settlements exceeded single damages.
instead of being returned to U.S. consumers and businesses. 23 It is interesting that of the total amount recovered a large proportion -at least 42% to 46%; $7,631 to $8,981 million -came from the fifteen cases that did not follow publicly disclosed United States government or EU enforcement actions.
Given the current global market, no doubt the lack of a private remedy means many citizens of nations other than the U.S. remain uncompensated for harms they suffered from illegal and anticompetitive conduct by actors beyond their national borders. 24 For each of the cases listed in Table 3 , private plaintiffs appear to have completely uncovered the violations, and initiated and pursued the litigation, with the government following the private plaintiffs' lead or playing no role at all. Another $4,212 million came from cases with a mixed private/public origin (Table 4) . This project did not select cases on the basis of whether a foreign defendant was likely to be involved.
Only about a third of the 24 When conduct gave rise to both government and private litigation we tried to ascertain who first uncovered the antitrust violation. For many of the cases our researchers spent dozens of hours on this issue. However, because government records are confidential and the enforcers usually do not reveal or discuss their investigations, we could not always make definitive classifications. Because we had access only to publicly available information some of our classifications could be mistaken. (Table 5 ). There also were cases whose origin we were not able to ascertain. 27 The authors were surprised at the high proportion of private actions that were filed in the absence of government cases, that had mixed public/private origins, or that significantly expanded the relief obtained through government enforcement alone.
Of the total $18,006 to $19,639 million in recoveries we documented, $12,088 to $13,438 million (67%-68% of the total), in 32 cases, was recovered by direct purchasers; $1,815 million, in 6 cases, was recovered by indirect purchasers; and different private antitrust suit, which led to a government investigation in the polypropylene carpet market, that in turn led to the private litigation analyzed in this Report. See Table 4 for other examples.
$4,028 to $4,311 million, in 6 cases, was recovered by competitors.
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All but 6 of the cases were class actions. See Auction House case summaries, Benefits, supra note 1. These coupons traded for a value that reflected their discounted present value. They also comprised 20% of the legal fees paid to prevailing attorneys, who said they will redeem them for cash after the expiration of the mandatory five year waiting period. See, for example, the Insurance case. This case resulted in a cash settlement with a creative remedy that: (i) funded the development of a public entity that provides risk management education and technical services to small businesses, public entities, and non profits; and (ii) provide funds to the States to develop a risk database for municipalities and local governments. 45 To the extent the purpose of the remedy is compensation, the "damages" caused by an antitrust violation should consist of the sum of all relatively predictable harms caused by that violation affecting anyone other than the defendants. Damages should include the wealth transferred from consumers to the violator(s), as well as the allocative inefficiency effects felt by society, whether caused directly, or indirectly via "umbrella" effects. Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, the value of plaintiffs' time spent pursuing the case, and the cost to the American taxpayer of administering the judicial system should also be included. When all these adjustments are made it is likely that the United States "treble" damages remedy actually is less than single damages. Id. As the Antitrust Modernization Commission noted: "Indeed, in light of the fact that some damages may not be recoverable (e.g., compensation for interest prior to judgment, or because of the statute of limitations and the inability to recover 'speculative' damages) treble damages help ensure that victims will recover at least their actual damages." Antitrust Modernization Commission, Report and Recommendations, at 246 (2007) (footnote omitted). In the United States, State Attorneys' General can bring parens patria actions on behalf of victims located within their states, and the Federal Trade Commission has succeeded in disgorgement actions, but these actions are rare. 51 As Irwin Stelzer observed, "An army of private enforcers, enlisting help from attorney-entrepreneurs free to accept 56 The largest antitrust cases often last for 5-10 years. The government often has trouble retaining a well qualified team throughout this period. Private firms, by contrast, often are able to retain relatively intact teams for longer periods.
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Irwin Stelzer noted: "A less obvious but equally important reason that private enforcement is so important is that it is free of direct political influence. In America, administrations come and go, some more given to a jaundiced view of the activities of dominant firms than others, witness the soft settlement worked out with Microsoft when the Bush administration took office and control of the Department of Justice, and its current disinclination to file any Section 2 cases." Seltzer, supra note 51, at 6. Note: We did not include cases in which we were unable to determine whether private or public action came first, in which the two arose simultaneously or in a mixed fashion, or which resulted from government investigation into a different conspiracy. Note: The El Paso settlement was recovered mostly, but not entirely, by indirect purchasers. We have not been able to segregate the small amount of recovery by direct purchasers.
In addition, it should be noted that NCAA involved a monopsony by direct purchasers. The Airline Tickets Commission case also involved collusion by buyers.
